Results for 'E. Glenn Schellenberg'

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  1. Spatial perception: The perspectival aspect of perception.E. J. Green & Susanna Schellenberg - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (2):e12472.
    When we perceive an object, we perceive the object from a perspective. As a consequence of the perspectival nature of perception, when we perceive, say, a circular coin from different angles, there is a respect in which the coin looks circular throughout, but also a respect in which the coin's appearance changes. More generally, perception of shape and size properties has both a constant aspect—an aspect that remains stable across changes in perspective—and a perspectival aspect—an aspect that changes depending on (...)
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  2. Teachers’ entrepreneurial competence and teaching methods in entrepreneurship education: A basis for teachers training curriculum.Cris S. Saranza, Nina Lyn E. Bueno, Glenn R. Andrin & Melvin M. Ninal - 2022 - European Scholar Journal 3 (6):66-86.
    Entrepreneurship education is among the key drivers of the country’s economy, and teachers are primarily responsible for its integration into teaching and finding the best and most useful method. The purpose of this research is to determine the level of entrepreneurial competence and teaching methods among entrepreneurship education teachers. Focusing on the concept of entrepreneurial competencies combining conceptual, human relations, strategic, commitment, opportunity, organizational and strategic competencies. Using quantitative – descriptive survey, the study tested its significant difference and relationship when (...)
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  3. What Race Terms Do: Du Bois, Biology, and Psychology on the Meanings of "Race".Glenn Trujillo - 2018 - Southwest Philosophy Review 34 (1):235-247.
    This paper does two things. First, it interprets the work of W. E. B. Du Bois to reveal that the meanings of race terms are grounded by both a historical and an aspirational component. Race terms refer to a backward-looking component that traces the history of the group to its present time, as well as a forward-looking component that sets out values and goals for the group. Race terms thus refer to a complex cluster of concepts that involve biological, sociological, (...)
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  4. Evaluating Methods of Correcting for Multiple Comparisons Implemented in SPM12 in Social Neuroscience fMRI Studies: An Example from Moral Psychology.Hyemin Han & Andrea L. Glenn - 2018 - Social Neuroscience 13 (3):257-267.
    In fMRI research, the goal of correcting for multiple comparisons is to identify areas of activity that reflect true effects, and thus would be expected to replicate in future studies. Finding an appropriate balance between trying to minimize false positives (Type I error) while not being too stringent and omitting true effects (Type II error) can be challenging. Furthermore, the advantages and disadvantages of these types of errors may differ for different areas of study. In many areas of social neuroscience (...)
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  5. Can You See a Ganzfeld? A Critical Notice of The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence, Susanna Schellenberg, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018, xv + 251 pp., £69.00 (hbk), ISBN: 9780191866784 (online), 9780198827702 (print). [REVIEW]John Dorsch - 2024 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 1 (2):224-231.
    The first premise of Schellenberg’s particularity argument reads, “If a subject S perceives a particular α, then S discriminates and singles out α” (2018: 25). But this is false if seeing a ganzfeld is possible (i.e., a homogeneous field without any particulars to discriminate). In response, Schellenberg argues that seeing a ganzfeld is impossible by appealing to the ganzfeld effect (viz. hallucinatory experiences caused by ganzfeld exposure) exclusively as a ‘sense of blindness’. I present two challenges for this (...)
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  6. Hormônios e Sistema Endócrino na Reprodução Animal.Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva & Emanuel Isaque Da Silva - manuscript
    HORMÔNIOS E SISTEMA ENDÓCRINO NA REPRODUÇÃO ANIMAL -/- OBJETIVO -/- As glândulas secretoras do corpo são estudadas pelo ramo da endocrinologia. O estudante de Veterinária e/ou Zootecnia que se preze, deverá entender os processos fisio-lógicos que interagem entre si para a estimulação das glândulas para a secreção de vários hormônios. -/- Os hormônios, dentro do animal, possuem inúmeras funções; sejam exercendo o papel sobre a nutrição, sobre a produção de leite e sobre a reprodução, os hormônios desempenham um primordial papel (...)
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  7. Gametogênese Animal: Espermatogênese e Ovogênese.Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva - manuscript
    GAMETOGÊNESE -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva Instituto Agronômico de Pernambuco Departamento de Zootecnia – UFRPE Embrapa Semiárido -/- • _____OBJETIVO -/- Os estudantes bem informados, estão a buscando conhecimento a todo momento. O estudante de Veterinária e Zootecnia, sabe que a Reprodução é uma área de primordial importância para sua carreira. Logo, o conhecimento da mesma torna-se indispensável. No primeiro trabalho da série fisiologia reprodutiva dos animais domésticos, foi abordado de forma clara, didática e objetiva os mecanismos de diferenciação (...)
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  8.  40
    Il sole del cosmo e le torte che sono chiaramente segni di pioggia: osservazioni sui nuovi Studies on the Derveni Papyrus.Walter Lapini - 2024 - Noctua 11 (3):486-503.
    This essay deals with the recent book Studies on the Derveni Papyrus, Volume 2, edited by Glenn W. Most (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2022). After assessing its merits and shortcomings, it makes some general points about current publishing, research ethics, and the dangers of co-optation in collaborative work.
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  9. Fisiologia Clínica do Ciclo Estral de Vacas Leiteiras: Desenvolvimento Folicular, Corpo Lúteo e Etapas do Estro.Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva - manuscript
    REPRODUÇÃO ANIMAL: O CICLO ESTRAL DE BOVINOS LEITEIROS – Desenvolvimento Folicular, Corpo Lúteo e Etapas do Estro ANIMAL REPRODUCTION: THE OESTROUS CYCLE OF DAIRY BOVINES -Follicular Development, Corpus Luteum and Stages of Estrus Apoio: Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva Departamento de Zootecnia da UFRPE E-mail: [email protected] WhatsApp: (82)98143-8399 FISIOLOGIA CLÍNICA DO CICLO ESTRAL DE BOVINOS LEITEIROS 1. RESUMO A fêmea bovina apresenta ciclos estrais em intervalos de 19 a 23 dias e estes só são interrompidos durante a gestação ou devido (...)
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  10. Action and self-location in perception.Susanna Schellenberg - 2007 - Mind 116 (463):603-632.
    I offer an explanation of how subjects are able to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects, given that subjects always perceive from a particular location. The argument proceeds in two steps. First, I argue that a conception of space is necessary to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects. This conception of space is spelled out by showing that perceiving intrinsic properties requires perceiving objects as the kind of things that are perceivable from other locations. Second, I show that (...)
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  11. Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):875-896.
    Perceptions guide our actions and provide us with evidence of the world around us. Illusions and hallucinations can mislead us: they may prompt as to act in ways that do not mesh with the world around us and they may lead us to form false beliefs about that world. The capacity view provides an account of evidence that does justice to these two facts. It shows in virtue of what illusions and hallucinations mislead us and prompt us to act. Moreover, (...)
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  12. How to Make Faith a Virtue.J. L. Schellenberg - 2014 - In Laura Frances Callahan & Timothy O'Connor (eds.), Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
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  13. Perceptual Content Defended.Susanna Schellenberg - 2011 - Noûs 45 (4):714 - 750.
    Recently, the thesis that experience is fundamentally a matter of representing the world as being a certain way has been questioned by austere relationalists. I defend this thesis by developing a view of perceptual content that avoids their objections. I will argue that on a relational understanding of perceptual content, the fundamental insights of austere relationalism do not compete with perceptual experience being representational. As it will show that most objections to the thesis that experience has content apply only to (...)
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  14. Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence defended: replies to McGrath, Pautz, and Neta.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):929-946.
    This paper defends and develops the capacity view against insightful critiques from Matt McGrath, Adam Pautz, and Ram Neta. In response to Matt McGrath, I show why capacities are essential and cannot simply be replaced with representational content. I argue moreover, that the asymmetry between the employment of perceptual capacities in the good and the bad case is sufficient to account for the epistemic force of perceptual states yielded by the employment of such capacities. In response to Adam Pautz, I (...)
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  15. Capacities First.Susanna Schellenberg - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):744-757.
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  16. The particularity and phenomenology of perceptual experience.Susanna Schellenberg - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (1):19-48.
    I argue that any account of perceptual experience should satisfy the following two desiderata. First, it should account for the particularity of perceptual experience, that is, it should account for the mind-independent object of an experience making a difference to individuating the experience. Second, it should explain the possibility that perceptual relations to distinct environments could yield subjectively indistinguishable experiences. Relational views of perceptual experience can easily satisfy the first but not the second desideratum. Representational views can easily satisfy the (...)
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  17. A New Logical Problem of Evil.J. L. Schellenberg - 2014 - In Justin P. McBrayer & Daniel Howard-Snyder (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to The Problem of Evil. Wiley.
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  18. The Situation-Dependency of Perception.Susanna Schellenberg - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (2):55-84.
    I argue that perception is necessarily situation-dependent. The way an object is must not just be distinguished from the way it appears and the way it is represented, but also from the way it is presented given the situational features. First, I argue that the way an object is presented is best understood in terms of external, mind-independent, but situation-dependent properties of objects. Situation-dependent properties are exclusively sensitive to and ontologically dependent on the intrinsic properties of objects, such as their (...)
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  19. Perceptual Particularity.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):25-54.
    Perception grounds demonstrative reference, yields singular thoughts, and fixes the reference of singular terms. Moreover, perception provides us with knowledge of particulars in our environment and justifies singular thoughts about particulars. How does perception play these cognitive and epistemic roles in our lives? I address this question by exploring the fundamental nature of perceptual experience. I argue that perceptual states are constituted by particulars and discuss epistemic, ontological, psychologistic, and semantic approaches to account for perceptual particularity.
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  20. Begriff, gehalt, folgerung.Susanna Schellenberg - 2000 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 48 (5):780-789.
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  21. Précis of The Unity of Perception.Susanna Schellenberg - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):715-720.
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  22. Ontological Minimalism about Phenomenology.Susanna Schellenberg - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):1-40.
    I develop a view of the common factor between subjectively indistinguishable perceptions and hallucinations that avoids analyzing experiences as involving awareness relations to abstract entities, sense-data, or any other peculiar entities. The main thesis is that hallucinating subjects employ concepts (or analogous nonconceptual structures), namely the very same concepts that in a subjectively indistinguishable perception are employed as a consequence of being related to external, mind-independent objects or property-instances. These concepts and nonconceptual structures are identified with modes of presentation types. (...)
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  23. Una defensa del contenido perceptual.Susanna Schellenberg - 2020 - In Ignacio Cervieri & Álvaro Peláez (eds.), Contenido y Fenomenología de la Percepción: Aproximaciones Filosóficas. CDMX, México: Gedisa-UAM. pp. 19-77.
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  24. Belief and Desire in Imagination and Immersion.Susanna Schellenberg - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (9):497-517.
    I argue that any account of imagination should satisfy the following three desiderata. First, imaginations induce actions only in conjunction with beliefs about the environment of the imagining subject. Second, there is a continuum between imaginations and beliefs. Recognizing this continuum is crucial to explain the phenomenon of imaginative immersion. Third, the mental states that relate to imaginations in the way that desires relate to beliefs are a special kind of desire, namely desires to make true in fiction. These desires (...)
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  25. Skepticism as the beginning of religion.J. L. Schellenberg - 2011 - In Ingolf Dalferth (ed.), Skeptical Faith. Mohr Siebeck.
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  26. The Relational and Representational Character of Perceptual Experience.Susanna Schellenberg - 2014 - In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? New York, NY: Oup Usa. pp. 199-219.
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  27. Perceptual Capacities, Knowledge, and Gettier Cases.Susanna Schellenberg - 2017 - In Rodrigo Borges, Claudio de Almeida & Peter David Klein (eds.), Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 74-95.
    This paper argues for a sufficient evidence condition on knowledge and I argue that there is no belief condition on knowledge.
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  28. Experience and Evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2013 - Mind 122 (487):699-747.
    I argue that perceptual experience provides us with both phenomenal and factive evidence. To a first approximation, we can understand phenomenal evidence as determined by how our environment sensorily seems to us when we are experiencing. To a first approximation, we can understand factive evidence as necessarily determined by the environment to which we are perceptually related such that the evidence is guaranteed to be an accurate guide to the environment. I argue that the rational source of both phenomenal and (...)
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  29. Externalism and the Gappy Content of Hallucination.Susanna Schellenberg - 2013 - In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 291.
    There are powerful reasons to think of perceptual content as determined at least in part by the environment of the perceiving subject. Externalist views such as this are often rejected on grounds that they do not give a good account of hallucinations. The chapter shows that this reason for rejecting content externalism is not well founded if we embrace a moderate externalism about content, that is, an externalist view on which content is only in part dependent on the experiencing subject“s (...)
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  30. Accuracy Conditions, Functions, Perceptual Discrimination.Susanna Schellenberg - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):739-754.
    I am deeply indebted to Alex Byrne, Jonathan Cohen and Matthew McGrath for their careful, constructive, and penetrating comments on The Unity of Perception and I am grateful for the opportunity to clarify my view further.
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  31. Nature appreciation, science, and positive aesthetics.Glenn Parsons - 2002 - British Journal of Aesthetics 42 (3):279-295.
    Scientific cognitivism is the idea that nature must be aesthetically appreciated in light of scientific information about it. I defend Carlson's traditional formulation of scientific cognitivism from some recent criticisms. However, I also argue that if we employ this formulation it is difficult to uphold two claims that Carlson makes about scientific cognitivism: (i) it is the correct analysis of the notion of appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature, and (ii) it justifies the idea that nature, seen aright, is always beautiful (...)
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  32. A Trilemma about Mental Content.Susanna Schellenberg - 2013 - In Schear Joseph (ed.), Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-world. Routledge. pp. 272-282.
    Schellenberg sheds light on the recent debate between Dreyfus and McDowell about the role and nature of concepts in perceptual experience, by considering the following trilemma: (C1) Non-rational animals and humans can be in mental states with the same kind of content when they are perceptually related to the very same environment. (C2) Non-rational animals do not possess concepts. (C3) Content is constituted by modes of presentations and is, thus, conceptually structured. She discusses reasons for accepting and rejecting each (...)
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  33. The epistemic force of perceptual experience.Susanna Schellenberg - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (1):87-100.
    What is the metaphysical nature of perceptual experience? What evidence does experience provide us with? These questions are typically addressed in isolation. In order to make progress in answering both questions, perceptual experience needs to be studied in an integrated manner. I develop a unified account of the phenomenological and epistemological role of perceptual experience, by arguing that sensory states provide perceptual evidence due to their metaphysical structure. More specifically, I argue that sensory states are individuated by the perceptual capacities (...)
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  34. Comments on Susanna Siegel's The Contents of Visual Experience.Susanna Schellenberg - manuscript
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  35. What is Explanatorily Fundamental in an Analysis of Perception?Susanna Schellenberg - 2024 - In Ori Beck & Miloš Vuletić (eds.), Empirical Reason and Sensory Experience. Springer. pp. 223-250.
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  36. Sameness of Fregean sense.Susanna Schellenberg - 2012 - Synthese 189 (1):163-175.
    This paper develops a criterion for sameness of Fregean senses. I consider three criteria: logical equivalence, intensional isomorphism, and epistemic equipollence. I reject the first two and argue for a version of the third.
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  37. Introduction: The Hard Problem of Consciousness.Glenn Carruthers & Elizabeth Schier - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):1-3.
    In this paper we try to diagnose one reason why the debate regarding the Hard Problem of consciousness inevitably leads to a stalemate: namely that the characterisation of consciousness assumed by the Hard Problem is unjustified and probably unjustifiable. Following Dennett : 4–6, 1996, Cognition 79:221–237, 2001, J Conscious Stud 19:86, 2012) and Churchland :402–408, 1996, Brainwise: studies in neurophilosophy. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2002), we argue that there is in fact no non-question begging argument for the claim that consciousness (...)
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  38. A problem for Wegner and colleagues' model of the sense of agency.Glenn Carruthers - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3):341-357.
    The sense of agency, that is the sense that one is the agent of one’s bodily actions, is one component of our self-consciousness. Recently, Wegner and colleagues have developed a model of the causal history of this sense. Their model takes it that the sense of agency is elicited for an action when one infers that one or other of one’s mental states caused that action. In their terms, the sense of agency is elicited by the inference to apparent mental (...)
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  39. The Hiddenness Problem and the Problem of Evil.J. L. Schellenberg - 2010 - Faith and Philosophy 27 (1):45-60.
    The problem of Divine hiddenness, or the hiddenness problem, is more and more commonly being treated as independent of the problem of evil, and as rivalling the latter in significance. Are we in error if we acquiesce in these tendencies? Only a careful investigation into relations between the hiddenness problem and the problem of evil can help us see. Such an investigation is undertaken here. What we will find is that when certain knots threatening to hamper intellectual movement are unravelled, (...)
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  40. God for All Time: From Theism to Ultimism.J. L. Schellenberg - 2016 - In Andrei A. Buckareff & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.), Alternative Concepts of God: Essays on the Metaphysics of the Divine. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
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  41. Perceptual Experience and the Capacity to Act.Susanna Schellenberg - 2010 - In Nivedita Gangopadhyay, Michael Madary & Finn Spicer (eds.), Perception, action, and consciousness: sensorimotor dynamics and two visual systems. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 145.
    This paper develops and defends the capacity view, that is, the view that the ability to perceive the perspective-independent or intrinsic properties of objects depends on the perceiver’s capacity to act. More specifically, I argue that self-location and spatial know-how are jointly necessary to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects. Representing one’s location allows one to abstract from one’s particular vantage point to perceive the perspective-independent properties of objects. Spatial know-how allows one to perceive objects as the kind of (...)
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  42. Capacities-First Philosophy.Susanna Schellenberg - 2023 - In Brian McLaughlin & Jonathan Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, 2nd edition. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 406-429.
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  43. Schroeder on reasons, experience, and evidence.Susanna Schellenberg & Juan Comesaña - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (2):607-616.
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  44. Is it Wrong to Criminalize and Punish Psychopaths?Andrea L. Glenn, Adrian Raine & William S. Laufer - 2011 - Emotion Review 3 (3):302-304.
    Increasing evidence from psychology and neuroscience suggests that emotion plays an important and sometimes critical role in moral judgment and moral behavior. At the same time, there is increasing psychological and neuroscientific evidence that brain regions critical in emotional and moral capacity are impaired in psychopaths. We ask how the criminal law should accommodate these two streams of research, in light of a new normative and legal account of the criminal responsibility of psychopaths.
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  45. In Defense of Perceptual Content.Susanna Schellenberg - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):409-447.
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  46. The case for the comparator model as an explanation of the sense of agency and its breakdowns.Glenn Carruthers - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):30-45.
    I compare Frith and colleagues’ influential comparator account of how the sense of agency is elicited to the multifactorial weighting model advocated by Synofzik and colleagues. I defend the comparator model from the common objection that the actual sensory consequences of action are not needed to elicit the sense of agency. I examine the comparator model’s ability to explain the performance of healthy subjects and those suffering from delusions of alien control on various self-attribution tasks. It transpires that the comparator (...)
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  47. (1 other version)Perceptual Capacities.Susanna Schellenberg - 2019 - In Dena Shottenkirk, Manuel Curado & Steven S. Gouveia (eds.), Perception, Cognition and Aesthetics. New York: Routledge. pp. 137 - 169.
    Despite their importance in the history of philosophy and in particular in the work of Aristotle and Kant, mental capacities have been neglected in recent philosophical work. By contrast, the notion of a capacity is deeply entrenched in psychology and the brain sciences. Driven by the idea that a cognitive system has the capacity it does in virtue of its internal components and their organization, it is standard to appeal to capacities in cognitive psychology. The main benefit of invoking capacities (...)
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  48. De Se Content and De Hinc Content.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):334-345.
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  49. Friendship for the Flawed: A Cynical and Pessimistic Theory of Friendship.Glenn Trujillo - 2020 - Southwest Philosophy Review 36 (1):199-209.
    When considering the value of friendship, most philosophers ignore the negatives. Most assume that humans need friends to flourish, and some argue that friendships can be good, no matter the risks entailed. This makes conversations about the value of friendship one-sided. Here, I argue that Cynics and Pessimists have an important view on friendship, despite it being ignored. They hold that: (a) friendship is unnecessary for flourishing, and (b) friendship presents ethical risks, especially to one’s own self-sufficiency. I defend these (...)
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  50. The origins of perceptual knowledge.Susanna Schellenberg - 2017 - Episteme 14 (3):311-328.
    I argue that the ground of the epistemic force of perceptual states lies in properties of the perceptual capacities that constitute the relevant perceptual states. I call this view capacitivism, since the notion of a capacity is explanatorily basic: it is because a given subject is employing a mental capacity with a certain nature that her mental states have epistemic force. More specically, I argue that perceptual states have epistemic force due to being systematically linked to mind-independent, environ- mental particulars (...)
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